Good and Harm, Excuses and Justifications and the Moral Narratives of Necessity by Edwards, Susan
  
1 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/Taylor & Francis in 
General Defences in Criminal Law : Domestic and Comparative Perspectives on 28 December 
2014, available online: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781317129554 
 
 
 Chapter 6 
 
Good and Harm, Excuses and Justifications and the Moral Narratives of Necessity 
Susan Edwards 
 
 
Key words:-  necessity, justification, criminal law, gender 
 
Introduction 
 
The formalisation of a body of rules and regulations set out the structure necessary for the 
execution of a consistent law governing conduct. Max Weber writing on the ‘legality of 
enacted rules’1 theorised the essentialness of rationalisation and structure.  Simester and 
others agree that, ‘The legal system will simply not work if its authority is optional.’2 Of 
necessity they say this: ‘Derogation from its rules is not permitted save in specific, confined 
circumstances.’3 But Weber also recognised that with increasing rationalisation and 
formalisation legal rules can trap individuals in both an ‘iron’ and a ‘figurative cage’. 
Contained in this critique of modernity and rationalisation are two considerations, first the 
morphological problem of over-rigid structures of authority which he addresses in his critique 
on bureaucracy and its limitations, and second, his exploration of conduct and action in an 
attempt to offer an interpretive understanding of social action wherein he focuses on the 
intersubjective meaning of action for the individual and the social construction of motive. 
The recalcitrant and unintended consequences of the rigidity and inflexibility of bureaucracy 
and legal rules has been variously depicted in the nightmare scenarios imagined by Franz 
                                                 
1 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building (Heritage of Sociology Series, 1968) 215.  
2 AP Simester, JR Spencer, GR Sullivan and GJ Virgo Criminal Law (Hart 2013) 798. 
3 Ibid  799. 
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Kafka. In both The Trial4 and The Castle5, Kafka envisages a labyrinth of enigmatic 
normative rules in a legal world from which there is no escape. The protagonist of The Trial, 
Joseph K, is a bank clerk, and significant to the plot, an ordinary man, who is arrested and 
prosecuted for a crime although neither he nor the reader discover what crime he has actually 
committed and so he finds himself trapped in a web of an abstracted and secretive legal 
system. The problem of the this reification of law is also depicted by Lewis Caroll6 through 
his characterisation of the Red Queen who, when Alice is giving evidence, traps her in a legal 
abstraction. Legal theorists have been enthralled by Kafka’s prophetic vista where legality 
becomes fetishised, rendering the individual subject helpless. Such reification results in the 
consciousness of law becoming a thing, dislocated and cleaved from its moral and ethical 
foundation. Thus law if it becomes over-objectified can result in a banal law, a violent law 
and an evil law. Law certainly reached banal and evil proportions when law became the 
absolute authority and was dislocated from morality, such that in Nazi Germany it became 
possible to implement laws that were positively harmful and, when authorised, promoted and 
legitimated hatred. For example, on September 15, 1935, the Nuremberg Laws revoked 
citizenship for Jews, prohibiting them from marrying or having sexual relations with persons 
of ‘German or related blood.’ Further example is provided where in South Africa, the 
Immorality Act of 1927 prohibited sexual relations between whites and blacks, later followed 
by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 1949.  
                                                 
4 F.Kafka, The Trial (Penguin 2000). 
5  F.Kafka, The Castle (Penguin 1970). 
6 Lewis Caroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland  (Wordsworth Edition  1993) 141. ‘Let the jury consider their verdict,‘ the 
King said, for about the twentieth time that day.  ‘No, no!’  said the Queen ‘Sentence first—verdict afterwards.’ 
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In everyday legal life, in jurisdictions where there is harmony between legal authority 
and morality, circumstances nevertheless arise where the enforcement of the legal rule would 
be palpably wrong, banal, even absurd. In the criminal law, an exemption is provided by 
‘necessity’ whose arguments respond in exceptional circumstances to valid moral claims and 
provide a defence for those who, when conducting themselves in a particular way that is right 
in the circumstances, break the law. Perhaps Glanville Williams poses the question most 
appositely when he considers ‘...how far the  notion of necessity can create new rules or serve 
as an excuse for dispensing with the strict law where the exigency requires it.’7 The clearest 
legitimate application he identifies is where life is in danger.8  
This chapter explores the ambit of the defence of necessity and raises some questions 
around the negotiation of the ‘higher’ moral claims exploring the reasoning informing the 
sanctioning of some claims and the rejection of others. What is at stake here then is the 
relation of law to moral and ethical questions, to public policy, to the judicial craft and to 
individual motives for exemption. The ambit of necessity is unclear since its legally accepted  
claims are  shaped by context, in an historical and cultural fluidity, crafted by the judiciary 
who as necessity’s arbiters  balance  typifications of goods and harms in particular cultural 
and historical milieus. What we see at the surface is the playing out of these values and 
claims, and at times correspondingly the suspension of law, as judges act as the grand  
masters of morals. Judges as grand moralists in 17th century took to divining whether hunting 
on another’s private property was a breach of the law of trespass to be permitted in the 
circumstances of necessity.9 In the 20th century in Leigh v Gladstone,10 Mrs Mary Leigh, a 
                                                 
7 Glanville Williams, ‘The Defence of Necessity’ (1953) 6(1) Current Legal Problems 217-218.  
8 Ibid 219. 
9 Y.B.,M.12 H.8 10a,pl,2. Cited in Williams (n 7) 220-221. 
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suffragette who had been forcibly fed whilst on hunger strike in prison brought an action 
against the Home Secretary. Lord Alverstone CJ,  in his judgment directed the jury in favour 
of necessity, and said ‘It was the duty, both under the rules and apart from the rules, of the 
officials to preserve the health and lives of the prisoners, who were in the custody of the 
Crown. If they forcibly fed the plaintiff when it was not necessary the defendant ought to pay 
damages.’11The jury concurred although  doctors had argued that it was a question best 
decided by them.12 As Williams points out the doctrine of necessity ‘becomes particularised 
in rules of law,’13 as is clear by the instances above, with regard to whether the invasion of 
private property or personal liberty. In exploring the panoply of social claims that can arise in 
a defence of necessity, consideration is also given to the  authorisation in law of particular 
personal or intersubjective narratives. Here, the legally accepted narratives as they inform 
communication, and, for our purpose the shaping of motives for action, is also considered.  In 
exploring necessity’s motives the dominant discourses are considered not merely at the 
intersubjective level of actor’s motives for conduct (as explored by Schutz’s14 reading of 
Weber for example) but also as shaped by Foucault’s15 theorisation of discourse as  preceding 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 [1909-1910] 26 TLR 139, cited in Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London Stevens and Sons 1978) 571. 
See later Bobby Sands, One Day In My Life (Mercier Press 2001); Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb 
Family Division 4 October 1994 Case Analysis [1995] Fam 127; [1995] 2 WLR 722. 
11 [My emphasis] ibid Leigh 142. 
12 Anyone reading the experience of suffragettes on the receiving end of forcible feeding may conclude with the medical 
profession at the time that it was an inhumane and disgusting practice. See Frank Moxon, What forcible feeding means, The 
Woman's Press at http://www.brynmawr.edu/library/exhibits/suffrage/MoxonForcibleFeeding.pdf (Last accessed January 1st 
2014) see especially pages 6-7 for a commentary on the Leigh case. 
13 Williams (n 7) 222. 
14 Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Heinemann London 1972). 
15 Michel Foucault, The Archealogy of Knowledge (1969, Routledge 2008). 
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the subject. The significance of necessity’s motive, either  as a justification or as an excuse 
for infraction is specifically explored, concluding that necessity’s motive is one of 
justification, which  of itself presents a heretical challenge to law’s authority providing a way 
out of the iron and the figurative cage. 
Legal ‘Necessity’ 
‘Necessity’ provides an exemption to criminal infraction when the claim that s/he was 
compelled or impelled to act as s/he did permitting and allowing a disregard for the 
normative constraints of the law when a claim to a higher morality, or more weighty need or 
situation is the more desirable end. Both self defence and duress are in fact sub species of a 
necessity defence. Clarkson argues in favour of collapsing the defences of self defence, 
duress by threats, duress by circumstances and necessity into one general defence of 
necessity, termed ‘necessary action’.16 This schema for conceptualisation has some support. 
Lord Woolf CJ in Shayler,17 opined that the defences of necessity and duress of circumstance 
are ‘simply different levels of the same thing.... None the less the distinction between duress 
of circumstances and necessity has correctly been by and large ignored or blurred by the 
courts.’18 Chan and Simester,19 in response to Clarkson’s  schema declare that such a general 
defence is not possible because the rationales for the various defences differ, either being a 
matter of justification, or a matter of excuse. They develop in some detail their objection to 
such classification and argue that there are in effect four categories of exculpation: (a) self-
defence as justification, (b) duress where D may commit both a moral and a legal wrong 
                                                 
16 CMV Clarkson, ‘Necessary Action: A New Defence’ [2004] Criminal  Law Review 81-95. 
17 R v Shayler  [2001] EWCA Crim 1977; 1 WLR 2206, R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11 [2003] 1 AC 247.  
18 Ibid (CA) [52] and [55] respectively [Emphasis added]. 
19 Winnie Chan and AP Simester, ‘Duress, Necessity: How Many Defences?’ [2005] 16 Kings College Law Journal 121-
132. 
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where the pressure explains D’s motivation, (c) necessity, where the pressure is motivated by 
a lesser evils defence and (d) the best interests intervention of necessity - where the authors 
refer to examples of medical intervention.20 Each of these defences, say the authors, has a 
different rationale. Stark,21 in his review of Clarkson’s proposal and Chan and Simester’s 
argument also considers excusatory necessity and justificatory necessity in his attempt to 
develop a rationalisation of the necessity defence as he rebuts the Clarkson thesis explaining 
why he considers it will not work. Whichever way the defences are cut – excuse or 
justification, or the infraction as weighed against the moral claim there are differences 
between them and in addition as Williams points out,22 ‘[T]he language of necessity disguises 
the selection of values that is really involved.’ 
In both the circumstances of self defence and duress the defendant breaks the law, 
and, in the case of self defence23 his conduct may be excused and may even be justified when 
he kills to ensure self preservation, or (where duress applies) is compelled to commit a crime 
(murder excluded) following another individual’s threats of serious harm or death. Both self 
defence and duress, have in recent years, been further expanded. In the Martin case,24 a 
farmer shot at intruders with a gun, loaded with birdshot, killing one of them,  pleaded self 
defence and was convicted of murder. At the time, the law required no more than reasonable 
force to be used. Lord Woolf CJ said, ‘In judging whether the defendant had only used 
                                                 
20 Ibid 127. 
21 Findlay Stark, ‘Necessity and Nicklinson’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 949. 
22 Williams (n 7) 224. 
23 Beckford v R [1988] AC 130,‘A defendant is entitled to use reasonable force to protect himself, others for whom he is 
responsible and his property.... It must be reasonable’. See also a plea under s 3 Criminal Law Act 1967. See also Morris 
[2013] EWCA Crim 436. 
24 R v Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245 [5]. 
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reasonable force, the jury has to take into account all the circumstances, including the 
situation as the defendant honestly believes it to be at the time, when he was defending 
himself. It does not matter if the defendant was mistaken in his belief as long as his belief 
was genuine.’25 Martin’s conviction for murder was quashed and diminished responsibility 
manslaughter substituted on appeal.26 Lord Woolf CJ identified the public mood. ‘What has 
been the subject of debate is whether a defendant to a murder charge should be convicted of 
murder if he was acting in self-defence but used excessive force in self-defence.’27 Section 76 
of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, provides further clarification to the 
common law and statutory defences by enshrining in statute the essentialness of a defence of 
self defence. Section 76(3) sets out what had been the position in the common law - that the 
more unreasonable the belief, the less likely it will be considered to be honestly held. 
However, the much needed clarity is lost since whilst the degree of force used must be 
reasonable, section 76(7) also recognises that a person may, in such circumstances of fear, 
surprise, alarm,  be unable to ‘weigh to a nicety’ the exact measure of any necessary action.28 
Further attempts to refine the law on self defence have  followed in the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 with the introduction of an amendment to section 76. The force used may now be 
‘disproportionate.’ This is qualified by the requirement - ‘but not grossly so’, as provided in 
section (5A) such that, ‘In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be 
regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was 
grossly disproportionate in those circumstances.’ Such determinations will turn on the 
                                                 
25 Martin ibid [5]. 
26 Martin (n 24). 
27 Martin (n 24) [9]. 
28 R v Bristow and others [2013] EWCA Crim 1540. 
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individual facts of each case in interpreting this confusing amendment ‘disproportionate - but 
not grossly so’. Nicola Wake,29 has noted the opacity, ‘Perplexed jurors will be required to 
engage in mental gymnastics in order to determine whether the defendant's conduct is to be 
regarded as reasonable, disproportionate or grossly disproportionate.’ 
Turning to the defence of duress there has been some welcome and rather more 
comprehendible expansion.  Such a defence applies where the defendant is forced by 
another person or by circumstances (duress of circumstances) to commit a crime. The 
trigger for such compulsion is a threat of serious harm or death.30 I have critiqued the 
gendered nature of the criteria required for this defence particularly with regard to the 
exclusion of the factual compulsion created for victims facing the predicament of 
domestic violence.31 In this regard, the Court of Appeal judgment in R v Coats32 is to be 
welcomed.  Here, the appellant, C, had been involved in drugs importation. She pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. However, one of the group, W, had 
been convicted of a brutal murder whilst C was serving a prison sentence. W had been 
previously in a relationship with C.  W was violent to her and this was supported in 
complaints that C made to the police although subsequently withdrew out of fear. C made 
an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission who referred her appeal against 
conviction  to the Court of Appeal on the basis of fresh evidence of battered woman’s 
                                                 
29 Nicola Wake, ‘Battered Women, Startled Householders and Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian Perspectives’ 
(2013) Journal of Criminal Law 77 (433). See also R v Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer [2013] 2 Cr App R 3. 
30 R v Dao, Mai and Nguyen [2012] EWCA Crim 1717, where threat of false imprisonment was not sufficient, reaffirming 
Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, where the House of Lords limited the defence to threats of death or grievous bodily harm.   
31 Susan Edwards, ‘The Straw Woman at Law’s Precipice: An Unwilling Party’ in, Reed and  Bohlander [eds] Participation 
in Crime: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing 2013) 59-77. 
32 R v Coats (Goldie Ann) [2013] EWCA Crim 1472. 
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syndrome (BWS). The Court of Appeal did not accept that C was in fact suffering from 
BWS, but significantly, it did accept that BWS may be relevant to a defence of duress. 
What they did say was this. An accused would have to have suffered BWS in a severe 
form to be in a position where the will was overborne.33 The Court of Appeal in 
recognising the effects of domestic violence on the will impliedly accepted  the obiter 
remarks of Baroness Hale who in Hasan had attempted to educate their Lordships on just 
this specific form of duress.34 Baroness Hale said, ‘The battered wife knows that she is 
exposing herself to a risk of unlawful violence if she stays, but she may have no reason to 
believe that her husband will eventually use her broken will to force her to commit 
crimes. ... The battered wife knows very well that she may be compelled to cook the 
dinner, wash the dishes, iron the shirts and submit to sexual intercourse. That should not 
deprive her of the defence of duress if she is obliged by the same threats to herself or her 
children to commit perjury or shoplift for food.’ 
The defence of  ‘necessity’ is also part of this expansionist project but it is piecemeal 
and lacking in coherence. Simester et al write, ‘There is no unitary rationale of the necessity 
defence.’35 Indeed, it is simply not possible to rationalise the exemption from liability 
provided by a necessity defence. As Lord Woolf CJ stated in Shayler:  
Any attempt at a definition of the precise limits of the defence is fraught with difficulty because 
its development has been closely related to the particular facts of the different cases which have 
come before the court... in 1953, Professor Glanville Williams said, in Criminal Law, The General 
                                                 
33 Coats ibid. 
34 Hasan (n 30) [77]. 
35 Simester et al (n 2) 799. 
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Part, p 570, that the “peculiarity  of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility 
of formulating it with any approach to precision.”36  
Stark37 presents a valiant and at times persuasive attempt at conjuring an ex post facto 
rationale to its arbitrariness. But there is no one body of philosophy, ethics or morals that can 
be called upon to resolve whether, or when, the claim of a defendant should trump the claim 
of law. The judicial (and statutory) outcomes defy classification, rationalisation or 
formalisation, they are arbitrary, determined by location, culture, historical context and the ill 
defined and unruly horse of public policy. 
Common Law to the Model Penal Code 
In the UK, the legal defence of necessity still remains a matter for judges and the common 
law. In its draft Criminal Code, the Law Commission, when tasked with considering 
necessity, said, ‘We are not prepared to suggest that necessity should in every case be a 
justification; we are equally unprepared to suggest that necessity should in no case be a 
defence.’38 The ad hoc development of the common law of necessity has resulted in the Law 
Commission trying to inject some consistency proposing that a general defence of necessity 
be introduced into English law, and by 1985 that a defence of necessity - ‘duress of 
circumstances’ (excepting attempted murder and murder) should apply to all crimes.39 The 
Draft Criminal Law Bill, 1993,40 clause 26 provides: 
                                                 
36 Shayler (n 17) [46E-F] 2223. 
37 Stark (n 21). 
38 Law Commission Draft Criminal Code, (Law Comm No 177, 1989) Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and 
Wales, (2 vols). See also Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code, (Law Comm No 218, 1993, Cmnd  2370). 
39 Law Commission (1993) ibid, see the discussion at 77 [40.1]. 
40 Law Comm 1993 (n 38). See discussion at 35.1-35.12;35.3-35.7. 
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‘(1) No act of a person constitutes an offence if the act is done under duress of circumstances. (2) 
A person does an act under duress of circumstances if - (a) he does it because he knows or 
believes that it is immediately necessary to avoid death or serious injury to himself or another, and 
(b) the danger that he knows or believes to exist is such that in all the circumstances (including 
any of his personal characteristics that affect its gravity) he cannot reasonably be expected to act 
otherwise. It is for the defendant to show that the reason for his act was such knowledge or belief 
as is mentioned in paragraph (a). The defence would not apply to a person who knowingly and 
without reasonable excuse exposed himself to the danger known or believed to exist; the accused 
would have the burden of proving that he had not so exposed himself if the question arose.’  
By contrast, in the US, a necessity defence is part of the Model Penal Code  (a 
proposed criminal code drafted by the American Law Institute and used as the basis for 
criminal law revision). Following the case of The United States v Holmes,41 (discussed 
below) necessity is explicitly sanctioned and many US states have adopted some form of  
‘lesser evils’ defence.42  Section 9.22. specifically sets out the defence of necessity, where 
conduct is justified if: 
(1)  the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent 
harm;(2)  the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to 
ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the 
conduct;  and (3)  a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does 
not otherwise plainly appear.43  
California, for example, has laid down six criteria which are required before such a 
defence can be satisfied.(1) Preventing significant bodily harm or evil (2) No adequate legal 
                                                 
41 United States v Holmes (1842) 26 F Cas 360. 
42 See Model  Penal  Code And Commentaries 3 .02 cmt. 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) listing state statutes 
for ‘general choice of evils defense’. 
43 Penal Code Title 2. General Principles Of Criminal Responsibility Chapter 9. Justification Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility sub chapter A. General Provisions.  
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alternative (3) Act did not create a greater danger (4) Actual belief that act was necessary (5) 
Reasonable to believe act was necessary (6) D did not substantially contribute to the 
emergency. 
Whilst in the UK the common law defence of necessity has relied on three principles. 
First, the balance of harms test requires the harm of breaking the law to be balanced against 
the moral good to be achieved. Second, breaking the law to meet the higher moral claim and 
conduct must be objectively reasonable. Third, the principle of proportionality requires the 
breaking of the law to be proportionate to the higher moral good that will be accomplished. In 
both the cases of Nicklinson,44 and  Re A,45 these three requirements, originally uttered by Sir 
James Stephen, were reiterated:  
...there are three necessary requirements for the application of the doctrine of necessity: (i) the act 
is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; (ii) no more should be done than is reasonably 
necessary for the purpose to be achieved; (iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the 
evil avoided.46   
These principles are indeed enigmatic and fluid. They have been left for judges to 
divine and interpret as and when ambitious and creative counsel place such arguments before 
them.However, in some limited circumstances necessity arguments have been accommodated 
in specific statutes. For example, section 9 of the Midwives Act of 1951 makes it an offence 
for an uncertified person to attend a woman in childbirth other than under the supervision of a 
                                                 
44  R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice R (AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative 
Court) 16 August 2012 [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin) [2012] HRLR [64]. 
45 A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), Re [2001] Fam 147; [2000] HRLR 721 
46 Nicklinson (n 44) [64], A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), Re, ibid [225]. See also Pipe v DPP [2012] 
EWHC 1821(Admin). 
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qualified medical practitioner but no offence is committed if attendance was given in a case 
of sudden or urgent necessity.47  
Balancing the Incommensurable - Fur with Feathers 
 
Balancing the goods and harms or in the words of the common law ‘balancing evils’  requires 
making moral and ethical judgments. Williams recognised the philosophical and social maze 
of weighing necessity claims to any moral nicety. ‘Necessity in legal contexts involves the 
judgment that the evil of obeying the letter of the law is socially greater in the particular 
circumstance than the evil of breaking it.’48 In the case of Shayler,49 Lord Woolf CJ said, ‘the 
act must be done only to prevent an act of greater evil: the evil must be directed towards the 
defendant or a person... for whom he has responsibility... the act must be reasonable and 
proportionate to the evil avoided.’50 And so round and round we go and all the recitations do 
not move us to a clearer place in an effort to identify any guiding rationale.51 Necessity is 
presented with an incommensurability problem since it requires the weighing of  one claim 
against another, a task of morals and  ethics yet determined largely by judges of law and not 
of gnosis. Endicott expresses it thus, ‘The incommensurability problem: if there is no rational 
                                                 
47 Susan Edwards, ‘In Whose Best Interest - Everybody's Talking 'bout ma Baby’ The Leveller, November 1982,  22-23; see also 
PR Glazebrook, ‘The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law’ (1972A) 30 Cambridge Law Journal 96.  
48 Williams, Textbook (n 10) 553. 
49 S [2001] 1 WLR 2206. 
50 Shayler  (n 17) CA 2224, [49]. 
51 For a wider discussion on incommensurability see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1988), John 
Finnis, ‘Commensuration and Public Reason’, in Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical 
Reason (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press 1997), see also Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
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basis for deciding one way rather than the other, then the result seems to represent a departure 
from the rule of law, in favour of arbitrary rule by judges.’52 
Objectively Reasonable to Whom? 
The second criteria founded on an objective test requires a consideration of whether the 
infraction is reasonable in the circumstances. The reasonable man of necessity, and the 
reasonable man of provocation (now loss of self control), as the reasonable man elsewhere in 
the criminal law, is not an ahistorical man. He is indeed a time traveller, travelling through 
time, through culture, and through place. Clarkson recognises the historical contingency 
which is evident in the language he chooses to articulate the precept of reasonableness - ‘in 
our present society’, ‘culturally bound,’ ‘present time bound’  and ‘in this present law.’ 53 
Was the action of Captain Tom Dudley and Mate Edwin Stephens (discussed later) 
reasonable? It would appear from all that is known about this case that their actions in eating 
the cabin boy were indeed reasonable not only to seamen54 but also to the people of the 
seaport of Falmouth,55 but unreasonable to the court of law in London, and no doubt to 
ordinary men and women unfamiliar with the perils of the sea.   
Proportionate to What? 
                                                 
52 http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Proportionality_and_incommensurability.pdf 
53 Clarkson (n 16). 
54 See Neil Hanson The Custom of the Sea, (Doubleday 2000); AW Brian Simpson Cannibalism and the common law 
(Chicago University of Chicago Press 1984) ‘In spite of the frequent occurrence of survival cannibalism, often preceded by 
deliberate killing, and the abundant evidence of  nautical custom legitimating the practice of killing under necessity the 
survivors of the Mignonette have always been regarded as the first and indeed only individuals who ever faced trial for 
murder for killing committed in such circumstances’161. See also  Donald McCormick Blood on the sea (Muller 1962). 
55 Hanson ibid, AW Brian Simpson, ibid. 
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The third principle enunciated by Stephen is that of proportionality. As with self defence or 
duress, it is difficult to balance to a legal nicety a proportionate response especially in 
situations requiring an immediate decision, a decision taken in an emergency situation, or in 
extremis or a decision taken when the defendant is in a state of shock, or fear, or blind panic. 
What is proportionate to what? The perceptive Clarkson again, ‘Of course, an assessment 
whether a response is reasonable and proportionate must incorporate society’s moral and 
political judgments about what sort of emergencies or threats can be averted.’56 Lord Goff 
acceded in Richards,57 ‘the scope of the defence is by no means clear.’ 
The Legal ‘Rationale’ of Excluded Claims 
In applying these three considerations, English law, has set down, in a series of common law 
cases the imperfect ambit of necessity recognising very few claims. Bohlander is of the view 
that successful cases should indeed be exceptional.58 Simester and others also concur, 
‘necessity is a doctrine to be used sparingly...it is not a major organising principle of a 
modern legal system.’59 Perhaps this parsimonious usage is because necessity is heretical to 
the rule of law itself. Williams asks, ‘By what right can the judge declare some value, not 
expressed in the law, to be superior to the law’?60 Indeed by what right! Past excluded claims 
simply tell us what necessity is not!   
                                                 
56 Clarkson, (n 16) 89. 
57 R v Richards;  unreported 10 July 1986, cited in Michael Jefferson, Criminal Law (8th Edition:Pearson 2007) 268. 
58 Michael Bohlander, ‘Of Shipwrecked Sailors, Unborn Children, Conjoined Twins and Hijacked Airplanes—Taking 
Human Life and the Defence of Necessity Taking Human Life and the Defence of Necessity’ (2006) Journal of Criminal 
Law 70 (147). 
59 Simester et al (n 2) 807. 
60 Williams (n 7) 224. 
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Dudley and Stephens,61 is perhaps the most vigorous of all such rejections excluding 
murder from necessity’s ambit. The case involved four men who found themselves in in 
extremis circumstances. Shipwrecked and 1,000 miles from land, without food for 18 days 
and exhausted, they decided to kill the weakest of their members - Parker. The stronger drew 
lots as to who should commit the actus reus, one of the remaining three opted out of the 
conspiracy to kill Parker.  On the 20th day, Parker was killed, and in eating his flesh the two 
killers and the third man survived.  
 
Captain Tom Dudley and Mate Edwin Stephens were prosecuted for murder at the 
Devon and Cornwall Winter Assizes. Huddleston, B., by way of a special verdict, adjourned 
the case until the 25th of November at the Royal Courts of Justice. After a further 
adjournment to the 4th of December, the case was argued before five judges. Counsel for the 
defendants relying on Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, art. 32, argued that ‘The facts found 
on the special verdict shew that the prisoners were not guilty of murder, at the time when they 
killed Parker, but killed him under the pressure of necessity. Necessity will excuse all acts 
which would otherwise be a crime.’62Coleridge CJ did not accede to defence argument.  
Dudley and Stephens were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. Coleridge CJ ruled that 
necessity could never be a defence to murder. However both A W Brian Simpson63 and   Neil 
Hanson64 in their researches discovered that the residents of Falmouth considered the conduct 
of the defendants both reasonable and proportionate since three were saved whilst only one 
                                                 
61 Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 QBD 273. Known at the time as the case of the Mignonette.  
62 Dudley (n 61) 273. 
63 AW Brian Simpson (n 54). 
64 Hanson (n 54)  250,262,334,389.387. 260. 
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died.  Indeed it could be said that although Parker was ‘designated’ to die, he was after all the 
weakest and most probably the soonest to die and so Dudley and Stephens merely hastened 
his death. Their action was both pragmatic and desperate, committed in circumstances of in 
extremis where proportionality and reasonableness cannot  be weighed with any exactitude. 
Bohlander in reviewing this case questions whether it was more necessary to kill him Parker 
than one of the grown men?  He asserts, ‘To preserve one's life is generally speaking, a duty, 
but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it.’ 65 It was perhaps not more 
necessary, but in my view an argument could be made that as Parker was very probably going 
to die before the others, like Mary in Re A,66 she dying gave life to Jodie, so Parker dying 
gave life to Dudley, Stephens and Brooks, as the fate of the men in the boat was conjoined in 
circumstances. Williams,67 in his Textbook of Criminal Law said of this case, it ‘involved in a 
common disaster... the victim was alive, but his prospect of remaining alive for more than a 
short time was minimal, so that his ‘right to life’ was of a very small value.’ Williams 
suggests that a defence of necessity could have been accepted. I agree.68 Terence Morris and 
Louis Blom-Cooper remarking on the case also said, ’It is hard to understand why a man who 
is driven to killing as a result of acts of provocation from his victims commits manslaughter, 
whereas the person who kills to preserve his own life and the lives of others has no such 
defence to murder.69 
 
                                                 
65 Ibid Bohlander (n 58). 
66 Re  A  [2001] 2 WLR 480. 
67 Williams (n 10) 561. 
68 See (n 38) at 35.11 the Law Commission suggests that circumstances such as Dudley would be a matter properly for the 
jury. 
69 Terence Morris and Louis Blom-Cooper, A Calendar of Murder (Michael Joseph 1964) 289. 
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In the US case of Holmes,70 the ship the ‘William Brown’ founded in icy seas and 
with only two life boats all its 83 passengers could not be saved. Whilst some passengers died 
on board as the boat went down, further lives were lost as one of the two life boats was 
severely overcrowded and as water was coming in, Holmes, following the order of a mate 
spent a gruesome night throwing 16 passengers overboard to lighten the load. Holmes was 
convicted of manslaughter since the grand jury refused to indict him for murder. The judge 
directed the jury that his act was illegal because the crewmen  (and not the mostly Irish 
emigrant passengers) should have been so sacrificed and the choice as to which crewmen 
should have been forced off the boat was a matter to have been properly determined by the 
drawing of lots.71 
More recent rejected necessity pleas have involved far less weighty considerations. In 
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams,72 a number of homeless persons made an 
orderly entry into empty houses in Southwark owned by the council. The council’s 
application to the court for immediate possession was granted.73  The argument advanced by 
the homeless that necessity was a defence, was rejected. The circumstances in Buckoke v 
Greater London Council,74 were also insufficient to exempt the defendants from liability. 
This case concerned whether the driver of a fire engine, when answering an emergency call, 
could cross a traffic light on stop.  Lord Denning (obiter) set up a hypothetical situation in 
                                                 
70 Holmes (n 41). 
71 Simpson ibid (n 54)  166-170.See also the case of the Euxine  (1874) where lots were drawn and  cannibalism followed 
188. 
72 [1971] 2 All ER 175. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams and Another, Southwark London Borough Council v 
Anderson and Another [1971] Ch 734. 
73 Ibid at 744. 
74 [1971] Ch 655. 
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which he said, ‘A driver of a fire escape with ladders approaches the traffic lights. He sees 
200 yards down the road a blazing house with a man at an upstairs window in extreme peril. 
The road is clear in all directions. At that moment the lights turn red. Is the driver to wait for 
60 seconds, or more for the lights to turn green. If the driver waits for that time, the man’s life 
will be lost. I suggested to both counsel that the driver might be excused in crossing the lights 
to save the man. He might have the defence of necessity. Both counsel denied it. They would 
not allow him any defence in law. The circumstances went to mitigation, they said, and did 
not take away his guilt. If counsel are correct - and I accept that they are - nevertheless such a 
man should not be prosecuted. He should be congratulated.’75 
Where individuals have cultivated cannabis for medicinal use to alleviate their own 
pain and suffering and advanced a defence of necessity the courts have held that necessity is 
not available.76 Here, Alan Reed has this to say, ‘The defence of medical necessity has been 
solipsistically deployed by the judiciary for reasons of policy rather than strict logic.’77 
The Problem of the Door No Man could Shut 
In limiting the ambit of necessity judges warn against the dangers of the misplaced 
development of this defence. In Dudley and Stephens,78 Lord Coleridge warned that necessity 
could ‘be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime.’ Whilst Denning J, 
a century later in Southwark, was at pains to point out that the doctrine so enunciated must, 
be carefully circumscribed otherwise necessity would open the door ‘to many an excuse.’  
                                                 
75 Ibid 668A-C. 
76 R v Quayle (Barry) and others, also known as: Attorney General's Reference (No.2 of 2004), Re Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) 27 May 2005, EWCA 1415. 
77 Alan Reed ‘Necessity: Supply of Cannabis for Medical Purpose’ (2005) 69(6) Journal of Criminal Law 464. 
78 Dudley (n 61). 
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‘Necessity would open a door which no man could shut. It would not only be those in 
extreme need who would enter. There would be others who would imagine that they were in 
need, or would invent a need, so as to gain entry. Each man would say his need was greater 
than the next man's. The plea would be an excuse for all sorts of wrongdoing. So the courts 
must, for the sake of law and order, take a firm stand. They must refuse to admit the plea of 
necessity to the hungry and the homeless: and trust that their distress will be relieved by the 
charitable and the good.’79 Lord Edmund Davies in similar dissuasion said, ‘[T]he law 
regards with deepest suspicion any remedies of self-help, and permits those remedies to be 
resorted to only in very special circumstances. The reason for such circumspection is clear - 
necessity can very easily become simply a mask for anarchy.’80  
But few accounts refer to the abuse of the defence of necessity that occurred in 
Gregson v Gilbert 1783,81 the Zong case, where 150 slaves were pushed overboard because 
water was running short. Although Glanville Williams does indeed lead with this case in his 
article on necessity.82 As slaves, the men were owned as chattel and had a property value, the 
loss of which could be estimated in monetary value, thus Gregson (the shipowners), brought a 
claim for the loss of their slaves (£30 each) from their underwriters (Gilbert) who refused to 
pay.  
  So divining what passes as necessity is a matter for judges. So on the one hand to 
accede to the defence advanced in Dudley and Stephens was perhaps to allow conduct beyond 
the moral pail and villainous, whilst to break the law in Buckoke was the course of action for 
                                                 
79 Southwark  (n 72) 744CD. 
80 Southwark (n 72) 740.   
81 Gregson v Gilbert (1783) 3 Doug KB 232, 99 ER 629 (KB). 
82  Williams (n 7) 224. 
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heroes. And so where is the rationale when questions inhabiting perhaps not the two ends of 
the spectrum of claims as above,  are presented to the courts? Alan Reed,83 writing on 
decision making in the context of drugs cases where necessity has been pleaded,84 refers to 
what he calls the operation of a judicial divining rod. ‘This body of jurisprudence is so 
inconsistent and policy themed that it seems to have come about by judicial divining rod.’    
Accepted Claims  
Whilst there may be perfectly legitimate moral and ethical arguments pressing for an 
exemption from the force of the criminal law, including pleadings of poverty, starvation, 
homelessness, and sickness, it is only in a very restricted set of circumstances that necessity 
pleas been accepted by the judiciary in judge made law as creating exonerable exemptions. 
So what claims have they accepted? Lord Denning in The Closing Chapter sets out some of 
these circumstances where presumably these exceptional claims of necessity have inhabited a 
higher or weightier moral ground. Starting with a case from the Year Book of 1499, when a 
prison caught fire and a prisoner who broke the door down in order to escape from the fire 
was held to have a defence of necessity ‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay 
to be burned.’ Denning then mentions the Great Fire of London in 1666, when it was lawful 
to demolish intervening houses in an effort to stop the fire from spreading,85 and the 
jettisoning of cargo to save a ship from shipwreck on stormy seas in Mouse’s case.86 
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85 Tom Denning,  The Closing Chapter (Butterworths 1983) 68. 
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In Cope v Sharpe (No 2),87 ‘[T]he plaintiff, an owner of land, let the shooting rights 
over the land to one C., whose bailiff and head gamekeeper the defendant was. A fire broke 
out on the land, and, while men in the employ of the plaintiff were endeavouring to beat it 
out, the defendant set fire to strips of heather between the fire and a part of the shooting 
where there were some nesting pheasants, the property of his master. Shortly afterwards the 
plaintiff's men succeeded in extinguishing the fire. The plaintiff brought an action of trespass 
in the county court. The Court held that  (1.) ‘Was the method adopted by the defendant in 
fact necessary far the protection of his master's property?’ and (2.) ‘If not, was it reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances?’ 88 Denning stated, ‘There is authority for saying that in case 
of great and imminent danger, in order to preserve life, the law will permit of an 
encroachment on private property.’ The claims of private property and chattels have 
surrendered in these circumstances.  
Doctors Duty and Necessity  
In modern times necessity has been pleaded with regard to a number of medical decisions as 
the power of physicians in the modern world is recognised.89 Physicians are in a very 
different position to others since ‘their’ necessity decisions involve the balancing of particular 
competing claims which inhabit the arena of ethical questions that are overlaid by religious 
precepts, matters of conscience, and in addition and most importantly their professional 
oath.90 Physicians’ claims to necessity Chan and Simester describe as ‘best interests 
                                                 
87 [1912] 1 KB 496. 
88 Ibid 500-501. 
89See Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis (Open Forum 1974). 
90 The Hippocratic Oath is not just about patient confidentiality it holds physicians to this duty, ‘I will use treatments for the 
benefit of the ill in accordance with my ability and my judgment, but from what is to their harm and injustice I will keep 
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interventions’ which the authors claim involve some form of paternalism.91 Stark,92 in 
reviewing the necessity defence in this area of circumstances also speaks in the language of 
‘best interests interventions’. Physicians in saving lives or preventing harm have on occasion 
relied on the defence of necessity, aligning the physician’s duty to alleviate human suffering93 
and the legal duty. In R v Bourne,94 a doctor performed an abortion on an adolescent girl of 
14 years of age who had been violently raped by five soldiers. It was his duty as a doctor to 
save life, both physical and mental and to alleviate suffering. Yet, Dr Bourne was prosecuted 
under (section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.)95 The evidence submitted on 
behalf of the defence was that the girl would have become a ‘mental wreck’ had the 
pregnancy continued. Dr Bourne in evidence asserted that he considered it his duty as a 
doctor to perform the operation. The judge, MacNaghten J, in his summing up impliedly 
made the case for a necessity defence and said that Dr Bourne performed the operation, 
                                                 
91 Chan and Simester (n 19) 127. 
92 Stark (n 21). 
93 In life and death matters this duty has been variously articulated as a duty to save life, and in wardship cases  over the 
years it has been differently articulated  moving from ‘letting a child live’ or ‘letting a child die’, then to express these two 
positions as ‘treatment to live’ and ‘treatment to die’, in an attempt to inscribe ‘treatment to die’ formerly expressed as 
‘letting a child die’ with a positive inflection rather than a negative expression of an act of omission or failing. More 
recently, the medical approach has now centred not on the outcome of treatment with regard to life or death outcomes, but 
instead focused on the medical objective of  easing of pain and suffering as the primary objective of medical health care. 
94 R v Bourne  [1939] 1 K.B  687. 
 
95 Section 58 ‘Administering drugs or using instruments to procure abortion. Every woman,  being with child, who, with 
intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the 
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any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, 
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‘unquestionably believing that he was doing the right thing, and that he ought, in the 
performance of his duty as a member of a profession devoted to the alleviation of human 
suffering, to do it.’96 The judge, drew on the provisions of the Infant Life Preservation Act 
1929 which provided a defence to such a charge where it was carried out in good faith for the 
purpose of preserving the life of the mother. The jury acquitted Dr Bourne of performing an 
illegal abortion. However, in the case of Attorney General v X,97 where a young adolescent 
who had been raped sought an abortion in England, public policy in Ireland, a Catholic 
country, took a different and more restrictive view, (albeit some 50 years later).  The Irish 
Supreme court 4-1 held that it could be lawful in circumstances where there was risk to life as 
‘distinct from [risk to] the health’ of the individual.98 Culture and context, religion and 
ideology clearly influence the judicial divining rod with regard to the necessity defence 
where there are competing moral/ethical and religious interests. Interestingly, MacNaghten J 
in Bourne had also said this:  
‘On the other hand there are people who, from what are said to be religious reasons, object to the 
operation being performed under any circumstances. That is not the law either. On the contrary, a 
person who holds such an opinion ought not to be an obstetrical surgeon, for if a case arose where 
the life of the woman could be saved by performing the operation and the doctor refused to 
perform it because of his religious opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of 
being brought before this Court on a charge of manslaughter by negligence. He would have no 
better defence than a person who, again for some religious reason, refused to call in a doctor to 
attend his sick child, where a doctor could have been called in and the life of the child could have 
been saved. If the father, for a so-called religious reason, refused to call in a doctor, he also is 
                                                 
96 Ibid (n 94)690. 
97 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1[1992] IESC 1; [1992] 1 IR 1. 
98 Ibid  53-54. 
  
25 
 
answerable to the criminal law for the death of his child. I mention these two extreme views 
merely to show that the law lies between them.’99 
 He was of course referring to protestant/Anglican/secular England and not a Catholic 
Ireland. 
In cases involving those who are lacking mental capacity or in the case of minors 
lacking legal capacity, the inherent jurisdiction or the wardship jurisdiction provides a shield 
of protection for doctors who in the case of adults and minors unable to consent to medical 
treatment otherwise might face prosecution. In the following cases involving the inherent 
jurisdiction the common law defence of necessity has been invoked. In F v West Berkshire 
Authority,100 Lords Brandon and Goff  held that necessity was a defence where a  35-year-old 
adult who lacked mental capacity and was incapable of giving consent, was sterilized. The 
High Court made a declaration that the sterilization was not unlawful and no offence had 
been committed where it was performed out of necessity to protect the patient. In 
Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust,101 a mentally incompetent patient was 
informally admitted, the admission was held unanimously to be justified in application of the 
‘doctrine’ of necessity. In AM v South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust Upper 
Tribunal,102 the House of Lords held that there was a common law power under the doctrine 
of necessity to detain and restrain patients who lack capacity and where detention was 
necessary in their own best interests. The common law defence of necessity has also been 
invoked in cases where adolescent minors have been warded. The golden thread in the 
wardship jurisdiction lies with ensuring the best interests of the child.   
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The question of whether necessity might provide a defence in assisted suicide reflects 
changing values as they impact on the law and perhaps presents the greatest challenge. 
Williams wrote in 1953 underscoring its chimeric quality, ‘Necessity involves a scale of 
values, and a judge in adjudicating upon the defence may have to make a decision of the 
greatest ethical difficulty.’103 Whether there is a necessity defence for a family member 
assisting in hastening the death of an already dying/terminally ill loved one who pleads to die 
or where a doctor assists in the death of already dying/terminally ill patient who pleads to die 
were questions raised in the case of Nicklinson.104At the heart of such actions lie conscience 
and the desire and necessity to end human suffering. That necessity, and, in the case of 
Heather Pratten,105 that question of conscience and of duty was poignantly articulated and 
acted upon . At her trial she pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the suicide of her son, Nigel 
Goodman, and was granted a conditional discharge:  
My son Nigel had the hereditary degenerative neurological disorder, Huntington's Disease. We'd 
both watched my husband die from the illness and knew the distress and agony it could cause. 
Nigel knew what was going on and that he did not want to be around to suffer anymore. On his 
42nd birthday he told me the best present I could give him would be to end his life. He didn't want 
to die alone. I tried to persuade him against it but I would not let him die alone and promised him 
I would not let him fail. Looking back I still believe that it was his right to choose. Other people 
have tried to end their lives and failed and then been left in an even worse situation than they were 
previously in. I was put on bail for murder for being with Nigel and putting a pillow over his face 
when he lost consciousness from the overdose. In the end I was charged with aiding and abetting a 
suicide and received a conditional discharge for 1 year.106  
                                                 
103 Williams (n 7) 234. 
104 Nicklinson (n 44). 
105 ‘Caring mother helped son die - Woman freed by merciful judge’ (The Journal, October 27, 2000).  
106 PA Newswire: Corporate Finance News (May 10, 2013). 
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In December 2013, the case of Nicklinson and Lamb was heard before nine Supreme 
Court judges in which they considered whether a prohibition on assisted suicide provided in 
the  Suicide Act1961 is compatible with Article 8 right to respect for private and family life 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.107 Counsel for 
Nicklinson(deceased)  and Lamb argue that the law should include a defence of necessity.The 
judgment has been  reserved until later in 2014.  
Behind Closed Doors and Beyond The Fringe : Necessity’s Negotiations 
The cases which have come before the courts however are indicative only of a fraction of the 
causes and cases in which a defence of necessity is pleaded since the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS), especially in recent times, sifts through potential necessity pleas and takes the 
decision to prosecute, informed by conviction potential and also by public policy. The Law 
Commission,108 recognised that where the infraction was a minor one and necessity might be 
pleaded as a defence then prosecutions were unlikely. In any event, Lord Shawcross the 
Attorney-General of England, in 1951, asserted with regard to the decision to prosecute, ‘It 
has never been the rule in this country - I hope it never will be - that suspected criminal 
offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution.’109 Although no research has been 
commissioned or conducted on this point certainly some of the  CPS discontinuances will be 
cases where although the test of sufficiency of evidence may be satisfied a realistic prospect 
of conviction is considered unlikely to follow, such that necessity arguments then may well 
                                                 
107 The Times, December 14, 2013.See also Stark’s argument that Nicklinson is not a case of necessity  964 (n 21). 
108 Law Commission Report on Defences of General Application No 83 (1977) 556. Para 4.2.1.p 27. 
109 See http://www.dpp.gov.fj/default.aspx?page=decisionProsec (Last accessed January 1 2014). 
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be instrumental in decisions not to prosecute110 and will subsequently impact on police 
decisions to prefer charges at the outset. For example, the Herald of Free Enterprise when it 
capsized killing some 193 passengers contained its own reality of a defence of necessity 
especially when considering the measures adopted by the rescue crew who sought to save the 
lives of the shipwrecked. A clear example of necessity was detailed in the evidence submitted 
to the coroner's inquest in October 1987.111 Smith remarking on this tragedy asserts, ‘The law 
has lost touch with reality if it condemns as murder conduct which right-thinking people 
regard as praiseworthy.’112 The incident was later recalled in the case of Re  A,113 by Lord 
Justice Brooke, ‘At the coroner's inquest conducted in October 1987 into the Zeebrugge 
disaster, an army corporal gave evidence that he and dozens of other people were near the 
foot of a rope ladder. They were all in the water and in danger of drowning. Their route to 
safety, however, was blocked for at least ten minutes by a young man who was petrified by 
cold or fear (or both) and was unable to move up or down. Eventually the corporal gave 
instructions that the man should be pushed off the ladder, and he was never seen again. The 
corporal and many others were then able to climb up the ladder to safety.’114 Of course had he 
been the subject of a prosecution a necessity debate would have been pleaded in his defence 
and a moral and highly publicised public debate would have ensued in which the competing 
claims of saving ten lives as against saving one life would have been considered. For many, 
no doubt, the army corporal was a hero, (as was the fireman in Denning’s hypothetical 
                                                 
110 As Stark notes, ‘ It must be assumed that other decisions about whether to institute prosecutions, and about how to argue 
cases have also impacted upon the ability of the courts to develop the law’ (n 21). 
111 JC Smith, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, The Hamlyn Lectures (London Stevens 1989) 73. 
112 Smith, ibid 77. 
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example in Buckoke)115 acting swiftly and decisively in an in extremis situation. Yet, judges 
(following Dudley and Stephens cited earlier) have decided that necessity can never be a 
defence to murder. But Smith (again) in commenting on the apparent resiling from this rule in 
the Zeebrugge case asserts, ‘...we have breached the supposed rule that necessity can never be 
a defence to a murder charge.’116 
The purpose and object of allowing a defence of necessity to succeed is to mitigate 
the harshness of the law. Clearly there is no consistent framework making it impossible to say 
with any certainty whether the law will consider a lesser evils justification defence or best 
interests intervention.117 What moral claims trump? Who is to say? Williams writes, ‘In a 
manner of speaking the whole law is based on social necessity.’118 Certainly, the claims of 
necessity are cogitated and conceded or rejected against a background of socially constructed 
exonerations that are shaped by culture, time and place as standards of public morality 
change and depend on the nature of the competing claims and the unruly horse of public 
policy. 
Necessity Claims in Disguise, Battered Women, Wives Mothers and children 
Further instances of necessity claims entertained behind the legal framework of necessity 
include essentially necessity arguments run as other defences. Here such cases rather  than 
being run a necessity defences have been shoehorned into existing defences  as the law in 
recognising its own normative gaps tries to avoid injustice.  But like the feet of the ugly 
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sisters defendants necessity claims have not properly fitted the shoes of the legal categories 
into which they have been pressed.  
Statistics on the death of female partners at the hands of male partners119 suggest that women 
in violent relationships face a crisis situation often only to be averted by victims themselves 
killing violent partners in self preservation.  Yet such women find themselves convicted of 
murder/manslaughter. In the US, in such circumstances clemency is considered for such 
women and certainly a class action of necessity might be appropriate.120 In the UK since the 
1980s counsel and judges in  avoiding injustice121 have stretched provocations’ elements122 in 
order to bring battered women within the defence. Arguably battered women who killed 
violent spouses did so out of necessity for self preservation, but the defence of self defence, 
as framed, excluded them, as did provocation and duress, all of which embodied a 
masculinist framing of the elements required founded on gendered notions of reasonableness 
and proportionality, and in the case of provocation, immediacy. Necessity’s absolute 
exclusion of killing from its ambit in my view furthers this masculinism. The new defence of 
loss of self control (fear) incorporates some understanding of the reasons why women might 
kill abusive spouses but falls short as it limits the plea to circumstances where the fear arises 
from ‘D's fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person.’123 From the 
                                                 
119 See Susan Edwards ‘Loss of Self-Control: When His Anger is worth more than her fear’ in Bohlander and Reed (eds) Loss 
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defendant’s experience and linguistic accounts, necessity has also been the driver where 
children have killed a violent parent. Accounts articulated by children who kill a violent 
father have been frequently couched in the language of necessity and the need for self 
preservation either of themselves and/or their mother. Again, as necessity is excluded from a 
defence to murder such circumstances have also been shoehorned into provocation or 
diminished responsibility defences. In R v Rose, where a son believed his father was about to 
kill his mother and so in preserving her life killed him,  Lopes J said, ‘...homicide may be 
excusable...if the fatal blow inflicted was necessary for preservation of life.’124  
Two sisters, Annette and Charlene Maw,  killed a violent father of whom the mother, 
Beryl, had said that he had told her she should eat one meal a day like a dog. The wife said, 
‘The night he died I arrived home from work, he said he felt like punching me and he started 
drinking and then my youngest daughter came downstairs and tried to make some supper and 
he followed her into the kitchen and he started punching her and spitting in her face...’125 
Annette went on to stab him having been given the knife by Charlene. Lord Lane (CJ), Lord 
Justice Frederick Lawton and Judge Leslie Boreham, reduced Charlene's sentence to six 
months.126 Lord Lane said the stabbing went beyond self defence or actions committed in the 
‘agony of the moment’127 and asked ‘[W]hat should be the attitude of the law to those who 
unlawfully and with violence kill someone who has treated them badly? Can the law tolerate 
this kind of behaviour when there are ample remedies.’128 In 1976, Noreen Winchester 
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received a seven year prison sentence for killing her father who had sexually abused her,129 
whilst William John Pearson, killed a violent father who was abusive to his mother and on 
appeal against a conviction for murder a manslaughter/provocation verdict was substituted.130 
In R v Tyler,131 the defendant had been convicted of killing a brutal and bullying father who 
had threatened her mother and her brother, called her mother and the defendant sluts, and 
asked the mother if she wanted a vinegar bottle put up her vagina. All these cases turn on 
necessity (in fact) and necessity is found  in the linguistic accounts presented by the 
defendants, but following the Dudley and Stephens rule no defence of necessity was available 
in law. Angela Browne,132 concluding on the battered woman writes that their ‘...affective 
cognitive, and behavioural responses are likely to be distorted by their intense focus on 
survival’ and are indeed necessity pleas ‘to stop him from hurting me.’133 
Necessity as a Challenge to State Secrecy 
Necessity claims have also arisen in cases where defendants challenge state secrecy and rely 
on necessity arguments also evident in their intersubjective accounts explaining their actions. 
But legal necessity has never been acceded where an individual wishes to use it to challenge 
State power. Simon Gardner,134 is also interested in this question. Clive Ponting admitted 
revealing the secrets of the Belgrano affair and was charged with a criminal offence under 
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act of 1911. His defence was that disclosure was in the 
public interest and disclosure to a Member of Parliament was protected. He was acquitted by 
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the jury. The women of Greenham common certainly regarded their actions as not only 
necessary but a matter of conscience necessary to preserve the world and the future. Well 
before Jones,135 committed criminal damage at an RAF airbase, Greenham Common peace 
women were prosecuted regularly in the courts where they pleaded necessity  and appealed to 
higher loyalities.136 One women charged with breach of the peace said: ‘I challenge you now 
to show me this peace that you talk about. How can you say such/peace exists, when people 
are dying all over the world? If you ask me now to keep the peace, I shall say you are either 
blind or a fool.’137As Rebecca Johnson wrote in 1989:  
Our use of non violence is not synonymous with passive resistance, for in intervening to prevent 
violence, we challenge the militarists and those carrying out government orders, confronting then 
with their personal responsibility for what they are doing, whether they are planning for war, 
building silos, driving cruise missile launchers or policing the bases.138  
There have been other claims couched in the language of necessity, for example 
Katharine Gun, a GCHQ employee, was acquitted in 2004 of leaking state secrets over the 
Iraq war. In her defence she was to have argued necessity. Yet, the case was dropped at the 
door of the court so we were not to hear it. 139 The defence of necessity clearly occupies a 
much more prominent place in legal defences than its case law reports. And like heretics its 
challenge must  be supressed or eschewed  for its presence casts a shadow over the sanctity of 
the law and its rules.  
Necessity’s Motives 
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Much of the academic legal debate on necessity has also considered whether necessity 
functions as a justification or an excuse. Why should it matter? The view is that the 
construction of necessity’s ascribed motive may also intersect with whether the breach in 
question  is accepted and if accepted how then is it dealt with. Adopting Fletcher’s view ‘... 
justifications confer ‘privileges’ to infringe the prohibitory norm.’140 For Austin, ‘In the one 
defence [justification], we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other 
[excuse], we admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility.’141 The 
broad argument is that justifications and excuses function differently in the criminal law and 
convey different meanings. When an excuse is invoked the actor usually accepts that the 
conduct was wrong, both legally and morally,and that it was wrong to transgress the legal 
rule  but was he unable because of some individual factor to conform. Diminished 
responsibility provides such an example of the functioning of an excuse in a recognition of 
rule breaking  whilst pleading illness and an inability to control himself. When a justification 
is invoked to explain conduct the actor may not accept that the action was morally wrong 
although recognises that it is legally wrong.  His justification may range from a rejection of 
the law to a strident expression of its moral fallibility.142 Provocation provided an instance of 
justification with its rhetoric, ‘She deserved  it’ serving as an example in partner homicide 
cases. What is being done is variously justified, condemned, excused, or permitted, by and 
through the use of language and rhetoric which is performative,143 that is, when a word is 
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spoken or written it becomes a relational entity; where words are used to justify and condone 
a behaviour or action, or otherwise condemn. The words themselves have a force and signify 
and give permission for, or else prohibit, the action. I want to rethink the relationship of legal 
categories of excuses and justification in the criminal law and particularly to rethink these 
constructs within the paradigm of necessity and the consequences the ‘motive label’ or 
attribution has for human agency has for permissions and development of the defence. 
Thinking outside the excuse/justification dualism in the context of necessity for a moment I 
want to examine and revert back to the dualism implicit in Schutz’s144 thought and examine 
his ‘because of’ and ‘in order to’ motives and their relevance for understanding necessity’s 
claims and acceptances and rejections. The actor claiming necessity appeals to both ‘because 
of’ motives –  because my conscience compelled me to do it and ‘in order to’ motives – a 
teleological prospective orientated action to achieve an ulterior future goal. 
‘Because of motives’ notionally contain more of a duress or duress of circumstance 
motivator whilst ‘in order to’ action involves being drawn towards the accomplishment of an 
ulterior purpose. Are these motives examples of justifications or excuses? I think that both 
types of motive  ‘because of’ and ‘in order to’and their relationship to the cause or precursor 
of action can be regarded as justificatory. The real issue here and throughout all the academic 
debates on motive in necessity lies in the quality and the nature of the action to be 
accomplished regardless of whether the motive drives or pulls. It is the 
moral/ethical/philosophical/political imperative that really counts. Horder145 states, and I 
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agree, ‘In necessity cases, the key issue is the moral imperative to act: what matters is 
whether in the circumstances it was morally imperative to act, even if this might involve the 
commission of wrongdoing, in order to negate or avoid some other evil. In duress cases, the 
key issue is the personal sacrifice [the accused] is being asked to make: should [the accused] 
be expected to make the personal sacrifice involved in refusing to give in to a coercive threat, 
rather than avoid implementation of the coercive threat by doing wrong’?In expressing 
excuse it is usually the actor who is excused. In expressing justification it is the 
circumstances and herein we implicitly see a repudiation of law and a challenge to its 
figurative cage. Actors acting in justification may appeal to a variety of motives from an 
appeal to higher loyalties, altruism, preservation of others, or conscience.146 Many actors 
convicted of criminal offences believe their actions were justified. However, in only limited 
circumstances is the law willing to accept justifications for conduct as functioning in 
mitigation. In fact it is here when justifications are mooted, either a change in the law is 
pressed for – - as in the case of householder-self-defence, or else necessity occupies that 
moral/legal space and is provided for in statute. As Stephen recognised, ‘it is just possible to 
imagine cases in which expediency of breaking the law is so overwhelmingly great that 
people may be justified in breaking it.’147  
But how important is this excuse/justification distinction to necessity? Chalmers and 
Leverick,148 in their distinction build on a considerable body of academic commentary. In 
teasing out the notion that necessity is really a defence where circumstances arises that call 
for the criminal law to be abandoned in favour of embracing the greater good, the term duress 
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of circumstance has evolved. This more clearly denotes that circumstances outside the 
individual intervene or supervene to make obedience to the criminal law blind in the 
circumstances. Ashworth has argued that duress of circumstances has taken over necessity.149 
Into this framework for motives/excuses/justifications enters ‘permission’ which in effect 
places the power at least from a performative perspective back into the hands of the law 
presenting the law as a self reflective arena. Ashworth and Horder avoid the language of both 
excuse and justification instead using the language of ‘residual permissions’.150 When 
medical necessity is discussed they momentarily move from a doctor giving permission 
slipping back to the language of ‘is it ever justifiable for a doctor,’151 but quickly return to the 
use of the word ‘permission’. They then go on to consider several examples where 
‘permissions’ have been inserted into statute, citing for example s 5(4) Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 which allows a defence where D’s purpose is to prevent another from committing an 
offence, s 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 which exempts an emergency vehicle 
from observing the speed limit. 
Necessity Good and Harm - The Moral Mesh  
Whatever the scheme either the one rationale ala Clarkson, or four as for Chan and Simester; 
necessity as an excuse or justification; the question of which moral/ethical/philosophical 
arguments in particular circumstances might trump legal arguments; nothing of any of this is  
fixed, all is negotiable. Outside the law there is considerable debate as to which moral goods 
or harms to be avoided trumps the harm of breaking which law. As Endicott has said in 
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another context we have the rule of judges and not the rule of law.152The defence of necessity 
clearly demonstrates that the law is not infallible and tries to provide a body of rules setting 
out when its veil of fallibility can be lifted. Necessity when it works outside the courtroom 
shows it is potentially a defence to all offences. 4Lawyers search for consistency and 
principle but the holy grail search for the sense in necessity is illusive. It is the product of 
competing morals, which in 1520 resulted in Brooke J asserting, ‘It is said that if I come into 
your land and kill a fox, a gray, or an otter, I shall not be punished for this entry, because they 
are beasts against the common profit.’153 On some occasions it does provide a route of escape 
from the figurative and iron cage of law when higher values deem. Certainly defence lawyers 
will continue to advance necessity claims on behalf of their clients. In R v S,154 the appellant 
(S) appealed against a decision dismissing her defence of necessity to a charge of removing a 
child from the jurisdiction where she feared that her daughter would be sexually abused since 
the child had made such allegations in the course of proceedings to decide contact. The court 
did not accept this as reasonable or proportionate or indeed the lesser of two evils. Perhaps a 
court of mothers whose children had been abused may have done so. It is impossible to 
discern a rationale, the law has developed on a case by case basis and should do so to 
mitigate the iron cage of the law. The courts have responded in accordance with public or 
government policy and the social construction of reasonableness, proportionality and the 
social construction of lesser evils. All these concepts are shaped by societal codes and 
conventions about behaviour and persons and are informed by constructions of class, culture, 
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power, (private power and state power), rights and gender of the day, time and place, it would 
be foolish to pretend otherwise. 
 
